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Abstract: 
Previous researches studied how the components of fiscal spending affect the economic 
growth but did not explicitly enquire into how to adjust the components in order to 
achieve the highest rate of economic growth starting from the present shares of 
components. We investigate how to determine the optimal adjustment by introducing a 
gradient method which explicitly takes account for the adjustment cost and incorporates 
the constraint that shares of components are summed up to one. The resulting optimal 
adjustment shares are proportional to the deviations from the average over elements of a 
gradient vector and independent from the choice of regression equations. The optimal 
adjustment share is completely estimated by using the linear regression with any choice 
of omitted variable if the adjustment cost is given. The result is free from 
multicollinearity problem but is considering all adjustment costs unlike most of 
previous researches. The paper also provides an illustrative example taken from the 
annual panel data for the Japanese prefectural governments. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Which component of government expenditure should be cut? Health?, security?, 
or education? Should tax rate be cut? These problems are important for advanced 
countries (Levine and Rehelt (1992), Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997), Kneller, 
Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) )and also for developing countries (Devarajan, Swaroop 
and Zou (1996), Gupta, Clement and Mulas-Granades (2005)). Most of empirical 
frameworks employ linear regressions in which the economic growth rate is regressed 
on the fiscal categories.  
 Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Xei, Davoodi and Zou (1999) have proposed an 
economic growth rate maximization problem in terms of fiscal category shares. They 
find out the optimal category share to maximize its growth rate. There are two 
approaches to solve this optimization problem. The first one is to solve this problem 
directly, given all necessary parameters. However, they cannot get sufficient kinds of 
data and then cannot estimate all necessary parameters to solve this problem. Therefore, 
they use the second approach, i.e., the gradient method (but implicitly use) and solve the 
problem starting from the existing category shares step by step. Then, in order to get the 
gradient vector at the existing category shares, they linearly approximate the objective 
function of the growth rate around the existing category shares. Thus, as a result, they 
have to estimate the coefficients for the fiscal category shares (which correspond to the 
gradient vector) in the linear regression, which coincides with the previous empirical 
framework and provides a growth theory with its framework.  
 However, there is widespread non-robustness about results from the linear 
regression analyses. The non-robustness may reflect two problems for a 
muliticolinearity of the estimated coefficients and for the adjustment cost of gradient 
method. For the first problem, they must omit one particular category share in the 
regression due to the linear restriction on the fiscal category share: i.e., summing all 
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shares equals one. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) have already pointed out this 
issue. Moreover, if the category chosen to be omitted is altered, the estimated 
coefficients of the included categories will change. Based on the facts, they insist that 
the investigator must choose a ‘neutral’ omitted category. However, Zhang and Zou 
(1998), Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xei, Davoodi and Zou (1999), and Jin, Qian and 
Weingast (2005) have dropped one or two fiscal share variables in an ad hoc manner 
without clearly stating any reason.1 The second problem is for the adjustment cost of 
gradient method. One element of fiscal category shares must be omitted in the 
regression equation in order to avoid perfect muliticolinearity, as mentioned above. 
However, when we use the gradient method, we need to consider the adjustment cost 
for all adjusted category shares. Because, the correct interpretation of the coefficient on 
each fiscal category share is as the effect of a unit change in the relevant variable offset 
by a unit change in the omitted category share, which involves the adjustment cost of 
the omitted category. No paper pays attention on the adjustment cost for the omitted 
category. The estimated coefficients will change, depending on the adjustment cost of 
the omitted category. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a tractable theoretical framework linking 
the share of fiscal expenditures to economic growth, and to produce an empirical 
framework adjusting the present shares of component of fiscal spending toward the 
optimal ones. Most of previous researches did not explicitly construct an empirical 
framework for finding the optimal shares although they studied how the components of 
government expenditure affect the economic growth. We introduce a gradient method in 
                                                 
1 Correctly speaking, they investigated the devolution of fiscal power from the national 
government to subnational governments to economic growth. They divided total 
government expenditure into the three levels of federal, state, and local government 
spending. 
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order to determine the optimal adjustment of shares. In this paper, the gradient method 
explicitly takes account for the cost of adjusting the share of component and 
incorporates the constraint that shares of components are summed up to one.  
The resulting optimal adjustment shares are proportional to the deviations from 
the average over components of a gradient vector and independent from the choice of 
omitted variables from the regression equations. We can completely estimate the 
optimal adjustment share by using the linear regression with any choice of omitted 
variable if the adjustment size is given. Our result does not suffer from a 
multicollinearity but is considering all adjustment costs unlike most of the previous 
researches. We provide an illustrative example taken from the annual panel data of the 
Japanese prefectural governments. 
Section 2 employs a theoretical framework proposed by Davoodi and Zou (1998) 
with a slight modification. Section 3 provides an empirical framework utilizing a 
gradient method, and proposes how to adjust the component shares of fiscal spending 
towards the optimal level. Section 4 gives an illustrative example taken from the annual 
panel data for the Japanese prefectural governments. Section 5 states concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
2. A theoretical framework 
 Following Davoodi and Zou (1998), the growth model consists of a production 
function with two kinds of inputs: private capital and public spending, where the 
function exhibits constant returns to scale in the two kinds of inputs.2 We depart a little 
                                                 
2 Davoodi and Zou (1998) basically follow Barro(1990) except for division of the 
public goods of government into the three categories of central, state and local 
governments. Barro (1990, p.107) discussed in detail the questions arising from the 
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from Davoodi and Zou’s model with three public goods consisting of central, state and 
local government. In our model, public goods consisting of the four fiscal categories of 
government expenditure: h (health), s (security), e (education) and r (the remainder 
(including industrialization and management)). Let k be private capital stock, and g be 
total government spending. All variables are measured on a per capita basis and 
population is constant: 
 gresh =+++ . (1) 
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas: 
 λδγβα reshAky = , (2) 
where y is per capita output, α, β, γ, δ and λ are all in [0,1] and α+β+ γ+ δ+ λ=1.3 
  
 The allocation of total government spending to each category takes the following 
form: 
 h= θ h g , s= θ s g , e= θ e g , r= θ r g ,and θ h +θ s +θ e+θ r = 1,            (3) 
where θ h, θ s ,θ e and θ r are respectively the shares of health, security, education and the 
remainder in the total spending on the interval [0,1]. The total government spending is 
financed by income tax at fixed rate τ: 
 yg τ= . (4) 
 
 Household behavior 
 We consider a long-lived household who chooses the consumption path {c(t): t≥0}  
                                                                                                                                               
specification of public services as an input to production.  
3 The production function in (2) is plausible if we think of k to include human capital, 
or if we think of a production function Y=AL1-αKαG1-α proposed by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995, p.153) where Y, L, K and G are aggregate output, labor force, 
capital and government expenditure.  
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to maximize his discounted utility, 
 dtecU tρ
σ
σ
−∞ −∫ − −=  0 
1
1
1 , (5) 
subject to: 
(i) the dynamic budget constraint of the household4 5: 
 cAkcykkk resh −−=−−= −−
• αλδγβαα θθθθτττ /1/)1(1 )()1()1( ,    (6) 
 (ii) the value constraints: 
 00 ,c y k given≤ ≤ , (7) 
where σ is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, and ρ is the rate of 
time preference. After taking the government’s announcement on the tax rate τ and the 
share of each fiscal category θ h ,θ s,θ e and θ r , the household chooses the consumption 
path. We write the Hamiltonian: 
 ( )1 (1 ) / 1/1 (1 ) ( )1 t h s e rcH e k A c
σ
ρ α α β γ δ λ αφ τ τ θ θ θ θσ
−
− −⎡ ⎤−= + − −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
. (8) 
The necessary conditions for the optimal path of consumption are given by  
                                                 
4 We formulate that the household is able to perform the production process since the 
same equations as those in a decentralized economy emerge. Using (4) yields y=g/τ, 
which together with (2) can rewrite k-1 by only g, τ, θ and A. We obtain (6) by inserting 
these relations into y and k-1.  
5 In Davoodi and Zou (1998, p.247), they consider cyk −−= )1( τ , where y is 
exogenously given for a household. The difference between (6) and theirs comes from 
the fact whether or not the household already knows a production function and the tax 
to be financed for the government expenditure before the household decides a 
consumption plan. The household knows them in our model. This difference leads to 
A1/α in (11) and αA1/α in Davoodi and Zou (1998, p.247), which has no influence on the 
analytical results but makes the expression clear.   
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Using the two equations above, we have6  
 φ(t)k(t) → 0  (The transversality condition), (10) 
[ ]ρθθθθττση αλαδαγαβααα −−==≡ −
••
/////1/)1()1(1 reshAc
c
y
y ,(The Euler equation). (11) 
Since the transition dynamics for φ does not exist, we can obtain the optimal path 
directly, and the consumption growth coincides with the rate of the growth of output 
and capital. The equations (6), (7), (10) and (11) determine the optimal path of 
consumption and capital. We simply consider the Euler equation (11) as one of 
necessary condition for analysis.7  
 
Government behavior 
 We assume that the government maximizes the growth rate of output in (11) by 
choosing ω = (τ, θ h, θ s, θ e , θ r ), while the value of ω is fixed for the household, 
subject to the constraint on the shares for fiscal category:  
,)(Max ωηω F≡  (12) 
subject to 
                                                 
6 By taking derivative of 0=∂
∂
c
H in terms of t, cc//
•• −−= σρφφ . We insert the relation 
of 0=∂
∂
k
H  into this relation. We obtain (11). 
7 We assume the following inequality:  
 })1}{(/)1{( /////1/)1( ρθθθθττσσρ αλαδαγαβααα −−−> − reshA .   
The inequality assures the transversality condition.  
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1,,,,0,1 ≤≤=+++ τθθθθθθθθ reshresh . 
The F is continuous, the constraints are compact sets, and then the maximum and 
minimum exist. The F is also a strictly quasi-concave (while the constraint for θ is 
convex) and then the maximum is unique. Then, the Lagrange equation and the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold (assuming that there is no corner solution): 
( ) (1 ) ,
0, 0 .
h s e rL F
L L
ω ϕ θ θ θ θ
ω ϕ
= + − − − −
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂
 (13) 
The solutions for the shares of health, security, education and the remainder, and for the 
tax rate are given by 
.*,*
,*,*,*
λγβτλδγβ
λθ
λδγβ
δθλδγβ
γθλδγβ
βθ
+++=+++=
+++=+++=+++=
dr
esh
 (14) 
If the actual expenditure for each share and the actual tax rate do not coincide with the 
solutions of (14), reallocation of resources will enhance growth rate. We need all 
parameters in (14) in order to numerically determine the solutions. In order to estimate 
those parameters, we need a data set of either (θ, τ , ρ, σ, y) or (k, h, s, e, r, y). 
Howeever, it is not easy to obtain the data of (ρ, σ, k) in any country.8 It is reasonable 
that Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Xei, Davoodi and Zou (1999) linearly approximated 
the function )(ωF at the present level or the average of data for ω. They came to use the 
gradient method as a result to solve this problem step by step and sought the gradient 
vector, i.e., the estimated coefficients for ω in the linear regression. They proposed an 
empirical framework in which growth rate is linearly regressed on ω, which is the same 
framework as the previous one without the growth theory.  
 
                                                 
8 In Appendix 1, we explain how to estimate (β, γ, δ, λ) by using these data. 
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3 An empirical framework  
3.1 An optimal adjustment of shares  
      This section investigates how to adjust the shares of fiscal expenditure starting 
from the present level of ),,,,(),( resh θθθθτωωω θτ == to the optimal one in which the 
rate of economic growth is maximized. We introduce a gradient method for solving (12) 
step by step which provides the optimally adjusting shares, and relate this method to the 
empirical framework of regression analysis.9 The gradient method extends the previous 
researches by Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xei, Zou and Davoodi (1999), and Kneller, 
Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) among others in the sense that it brings them a framework 
to optimally adjust the shares of fiscal components.  
We formulate a gradient method for maximizing a linearized function 
of )(ωη F≡ in (12) at the present level ofω  as follows: 
ZdFMax
z
'  Γ=  (15) 
subject to 
,0  and     ,02 =′>=′ 4 θξξ ZJforZZ  
where the partial differential coefficients ),,,,(),(     resh FFFFF θθθθτθτ =Γ′Γ=Γ′  with 
resh
FF θθθθτννν  and ,,,for    =∂
∂= are called a gradient vector, the differentials 
),( θτ ZZZ ′=′  ),,,,( resh ddddd θθθθτ= evaluated at the present level of 
),( θτ ωωω = denotes the adjustment of shares, the constant scalar valueξ represents a 
norm of Z, and J4 = (1,1,1,1)′ is a 4× 1 unit vector. The second constraint in (15) 
indicates that the components of the differentials of share variables add up to zero. This 
condition is necessary because both the present and optimal shares must 
                                                 
9 The gradient method is a standard tool for stepwise maximizing a nonlinear function. 
See, for instance, Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty (1993) for detailed explanation. 
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satisfy 1=+++ resh θθθθ .  
The norm (ξ ) of Z can be interpreted as a size of adjustment. If the cost for 
adjusting the shares of fiscal spending is proportional to the size of adjustment, the size 
ofξ can be a measure of adjustment cost. The adjustment cost consists of equally 
weighted components in Z. For any givenξ > 0, the problem of (15) determines the 
optimal adjustment in the sense that the solution provides the highest growth rate 
differential of dF(= dη) in (12). For easy of expositions, we introduce a notation 
),(),,,,( 43210 θτγγγγγ Γ′Γ≡  which plays an important role in the following discussion.  
  The problem in (15) is maximized at 
 ( ) 2/1**2*** '* −ΓΓ+Γ⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛Γ
Γ=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θθτ
θ
τ
θ
τ ξ
Z
ZZ with its maximum ( ) ,'* 2/1**2 θθτξ ΓΓ+Γ=dF  (16) 
where ∑ ==−−=Γ 4 141* 41,)',,( j jand γγγγγγθ … . The derivation of (16) is given in 
Appendix 2. The solution *θZ  is proportional to *θΓ which represents the partial 
differential coefficients of shares measured from their averaged value. The vector Z* 
determines the highest economic growth rate differential at the present level of ω. The 
share of government expenditure is adjusted from ω to ω∗ ≡  ω + Z* and the economic 
growth rate is adjusted from )(ωF to *)(*)( dFFF +≅ ωω .10  
Figure 1 illustrates how the gradient method works started from the present level 
of ω at the point P. The objective function ZdF 'Γ= of (15) indicates the tangent surface 
to )(ωη F= at the point of P. The optimal vector Z* is indicated by the arrow starting 
from the point P.11 
                                                 
10 We can choose any value ofξ as long as ω∗ satisfies the constraint for the problem of 
(12). 
11 Unlike the standard gradient method, the optimal differential vector Z* is not 
necessarily orthogonal to the tangent line q because of the constraint 0=′4 θZJ . 
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 [Insert Figure 1] 
 In order to estimate the gradient vector from the observed data of ),( θτ ωωω = , 
following Davoodi and Zou (1998), and Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) we 
linearly approximate the function F(ω) and set up the linear regression: 
 ittiitriteitsithitit uTCDBA +′+′++++++= ,4,3,2,100 θγθγθγθγτγη              (17) 
 where i = 1,…, I and t = 1,..., N refer to prefecture i and time t; ,,,,, 32100 γγγγA and 
4 γ are the parameters for constant term, tax rate, health, security, education, and the 
remainder respectively. B and C are (I-1)× 1 and (N-1)× 1 coefficient vectors; prefecture 
dummy Di is a (I-1)× 1 vector of prefecture fixed-effects, time dummy Tt is a (N-1)× 1 
vector of time fixed-effects, and uit are the iid random errors with normal distribution 
N(0, σu2). The coefficient vector of ),...,,( 410 γγγ in (17) represents the gradient vector in 
(15). We cannot estimate the parameters by using the ordinary least square (OLS) 
because the regression (17) has a perfect multicollinearity problem due to the restriction 
of θ h +θ s +θ e+θ r = 1. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) pointed out that previous 
researches had suffered from this difficulty.12 
 An alternative formulation of (15) is to directly incorporate the restriction on the 
share variables by deleting one of ) and ,,,( d reshjj =θ . We delete rθd by inserting the 
constraint dθ r = - dθ h - dθ s - dθ e into (15). The maximization problem becomes 
WdFMax
W
'∆=  
                                                 
12 The fiscal variables in our model are h (health), s (security), e (education), r (the 
remainder), and π( ≡ τy, amount of tax). The budget constraint is satisfied since the 
equation τ (=π/y) = (h + s + e + r)/y for defining the tax rate is employed in (17) and in 
an empirical study in Section 4. The formulation in (17) has no multicollinearity due to 
the budget constraint for fiscal variables, but has another muliticolliniearity due to the 
share variables. 
11 
subject to   0,
0
01 2
333
>=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
′+
′′ ξξW
JJI
W ,    (18) 
 where ),,,()',( 4342410 γγγγγγγθτ −−−=∆∆=∆′ , ),,,(),( esh ddddWWW θθθτθτ =′=′ , 
and 3I is a 3× 3 unit matrix. We note that θ∆ represents the partial differential 
coefficients measured from the value of 4γ , while θΓ  in (16) represents the coefficients 
measured from their averaged value. Though the formulation of (18) has a different 
expression, it is equivalent to that of (15).  
The problem is maximized at 
2/1
2****2
****
**
16
9'**
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∆+∆∆+∆⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆
∆=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θθθτ
θ
τ
θ
τ ξ
W
WW                          (19) 
with ,
16
9'**
2/1
2****2 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∆+∆∆+∆= θθθτξdF where θθθθθ ∆=∆∆−∆=∆ '3
1,
4
3
33
** JandJ .   
The derivation is given in Appendix 2. Plugging W** into the constraint dθ r = - dθ h - 
dθ s - dθ e , we have the optimal adjustment of Z as 
2/1
2****2
**
3
**
**
**
**
16
9'
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∆+∆∆+∆
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆′−
∆
∆
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θθθτ
θ
θ
τ
θ
τ ξ
J
Z
Z
Z . (20) 
The solution in (20) is identical to that of (16), and independent from the choice of 
omitted variables as proved in Appendix 2. The solution **θW is proportional to **θ∆ . An 
advantage of the expression in (20) over (16) is that we do not need each parameter of 
) and ,,,( reshjj =γ  since Z** is expressed only in terms of 
),,,()',( 43424100 γγγγγγγθ −−−=∆∆ . 
In order to estimate the values of 0∆ and θ∆ , we can use the linear regression 
omitting itr ,θ from (17): 
ittiiteitsithitit uTCDBA +′+′+−+−+−++= ,43,42,4100 )()()( θγγθγγθγγτγη .  (21) 
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Unlike the regression of (17), the multicollinearity does not exist in (21) and the OLS 
method is applicable. We can compute the solution (19) by using the estimates of ∆ and 
determine the optimal adjustment Z**. The share of government expenditure is adjusted 
from ω to ω∗∗ ≡  ω + Z**. We can say that when a particular component of Z** is 
positive, the share of its fiscal category is below the optimal level and we should 
increase it towards the optimal level. 
 We can apply the other three regressions analogous to equation (21), depending on 
what variables we omit from the regression equation. In fact, Kneller, Bleaney and 
Gemmell (1999) examined the regression analyses with changing omitted variables. 
However, once we choose a particular equation, say (21) for example, the additional use 
of other regression equations does not provide further information in the sense that the 
estimates of all other regressions can be computed by using only the estimates of the 
originally chosen regression equation.13 This fact will be empirically illustrated in 
Section 4. 
 
3.2 Comparison with the framework of previous researches 
 We review the previous researches of Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xei, Zou and 
Davoodi (1999), and Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) from the view point of 
optimal adjustment to maximize the differential rate of economic growth and clarify the 
significance of their contributions. Most of previous researches understood the problem 
along the following line of arguments. The estimated positive coefficient of a particular 
variable means that the present level of its category is below the optimal and the present 
                                                 
13 The claim above mentioned is proved in Appendix 3. This claim may provide a 
caution against some previous researches. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999), for 
example, seem carried out the regression analyses with changing omitted variables 
without being aware of this fact. 
13 
level of the variable should be increased toward the optimal with the same amount of 
decrease in the omitted variable as illustrated in Figure 2. However, they did not 
explicitly examine what combination of shares induces the maximum rate of economic 
growth.  
 [Insert Figure 2] 
We formulate the maximization problem:  
  WdFMax
W
'∆=                              (22) 
 subject to 0,2 >′′=′ ξξWW ,  
whereξ ′ is positive constant but not necessarily equal toξ in (18). This problem is 
identical to (18) except for the constraint. The equation (22) imposes a constraint 
directly on the norm of the vector W after deleting one of the share variables. On the 
other hand, (18) essentially imposes a restriction on the original vector Z. The solution 
to (22) is as follows: 
2/12***2/12
***
***
*** )'(with,)'( θθτθθτ
θ
τ
θ
τ ξξ ∆∆+∆′=∆∆+∆⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆
∆′=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= − dF
W
WW ,    (23) 
2/12
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⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆−
∆
∆
′=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θθτ
θ
θ
τ
θ
τ ξ
J
Z
Z
Z . 
The derivation is given in Appendix 2. The optimal adjustment of ***θW = (dθ h, dθ s, dθ 
e )′ is proportional to the vector of θ∆ . The result of (23) implies that the share of an 
element of ***θW should be increased when the sign of corresponding element of θ∆ is 
positive. Though the argument illustrated in Figure 2 is consistent with the optimal 
adjustment of ***θW as far as the sign of adjustment for each component is concerned, the 
previous researches did not discuss how to obtain the optimal share of adjustment even 
within the framework of (22). And the framework of (22) is itself not preferable to that 
14 
of (15) as will be explained later in this section. 
The result of (23) implies that the optimal adjustment vector depends on the 
choice of omitted variable, and it gives a different vector from (23) if we choose an 
alternative omitted variable in the regression. For instance, if the variable eθ is dropped 
instead of rθ , ),,(~ 343231 ′−−−=∆ γγγγγγθ  is the gradient vector for the corresponding 
maximization problem and the solution ),,(~ *** ′= rsh dddW θθθθ  is proportional to θ∆~ . 
The optimal adjustment of components (dθ h, dθ s ) can be different in sign among the 
two regressions. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) tried to find the regression 
which would provide a plausible solution of Z by selecting appropriate omitted 
variables. On the other hand, the optimal differential θθθ ∆−∆=∆ 3** 4
3 J for the problem 
of (18) is not necessarily equal to θ∆ . Even the sign of element of **θ∆  could be 
opposite to that of the corresponding element of θ∆ . The solution W*** is not 
necessarily justified from the analysis of (18).  
 An underlying key idea that distinguishes the two problems lies in how to 
measure the cost for adjusting the fiscal shares. The maximization problem in (15) or 
equivalently in (18) measures the norm of the original variables before omitting one of 
the variables while the problem in (22) does it after omitting one variable. The former 
formulation equally reflects the adjustment of each component of the shares in the cost, 
while the latter one takes account for only the components in the regression but ignores 
the cost for adjusting the omitted variable. The solution to the former problem does not 
depend on which variable we omit from the regression equation. But, the latter actually 
does because the ignored costs differ among the regressions. We believe that the former 
solution is more appropriate than the latter one.  
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4.  An illustrative example by using the panel data for Japanese prefectures 
      We provide an empirical example from the annual panel data for Japanese 
prefectures for the purpose of illustrating the discussion in section 3.14 
 
4.1 Data sources 
 The data are take from “Annual Report of Local Finance” published by the 
Institute of Local Finance (Chihou-zaimu -kyokai, in Japanese), and “Annual Report of 
Prefectural Account” published by the Cabinet Office of the Japanese government. The 
data for the 47 prefectures are available during the fiscal years 1981-2002. Each 
variable of the government expenditures are compiled from “Annual Report of Local 
Finance” (Settlement of Expenditure by Purpose) and defined as: 
h: (Health) = welfare + hygiene;  
s: (Security) = police + fire fighting;  
e: (Education) = education; 
r: (Remainder) = Commerce and manufacturing + Civil engineering works 
    + Agriculture, forestry and fisheries + the others;  
g : (Total government spending) = total value of the items above. 
                                                 
14 Davoodi and Zou (1998) work with time-averaged data since the benefits of fiscal 
decentralization are not expected to affect year-to-year fluctuations in growth. The 
growth regression is estimated on data averaged over five- and ten-year periods. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable is the average growth rate over these two periods. 
However, we use annual data as Zhang and Zou(1998), Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) 
and Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and Mulas-Granados (2005) did. For the sake of 
simplicity, without implementing the Hausman test with a null hypothesis of no 
correlation among the individual effects and the error term, we adopt the fixed effects 
model in (21).      
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The shares of h, s, e and r to the g are given by θ h ≡ h/g , θ s ≡ s/g , θ e ≡ e/g , θ r ≡ r/g . 
The output and tax are taken from “Annual Report of Prefecture Account” (Summary 
Tables)15: 
y: (Output) = Gross Prefecture Domestic Product at constant prices; 
τ : (Tax rate) ≡ g*/y, g* = total government expenditure at constant prices; 
η: (Growth rate of real output) = the growth rate of y. 
These variables are measured in per capita base at constant prices and the population 
data are compiled from the latter data base.  
 
4.2 Estimated results and illustration 
 Table 1 indicates descriptive statistics for the data set. During the period of 
1981-1990, the GDP of prefectures grew, on average, at the rate around 3.78% per 
capita per annum, and the average tax rate was 12.85%. Among the expenditures of 
fiscal variables, the share of health, education, security, education, remainder categories 
accounted for 9.38, 5.63, 27.21, and 57.78%, respectively. On the other hand, during the 
period of 1991-2002, the growth rate of GDP dropped down to 0.83% while the tax rate 
increased to 13.8%. The share of health increased to 10.15%, but the shares of security 
and education decreased.  Examining Table 1, we suppose that there exists a structural 
break between the periods 1981-1990 and 1991-2002, and divide the sample periods 
into the two parts. 
 [Insert Table 1] 
      Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating equation (21). The values in the 
                                                 
15 The data of 1981-1990 are based on 1963SNA standard and the data of 1991-2002 
based on 1993SNA standard, and measured at 1997 prices. The Cabinet Office of the 
Japanese government does not provide the re-estimated data prior to 1990 based on the 
1993SNA standards.  
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columns 1 to 4, respectively, show the estimates with the omitted variables, h, s, e, and r. 
The estimated coefficients are different depending what variable is dropped from the 
regression equation. More precisely, the estimated coefficients in each panel are 
symmetric about the diagonal elements as expected from proposition 1 in Appendix 3. 
For example, if we take m = 4 and n = 1 in Appendix 3, we have 372.0ˆ 4,1 −=γ  (the 
coefficient of health when the remainder is omitted), and 372.0ˆ~ 4,11,4 =−= γγ (the 
coefficient of the remainder when health is omitted). Similarly, we have 534.0ˆ 4,2 =γ  
and 906.0)372.0(534.0ˆˆ~ 4,14,21,2 =−−=−= γγγ  for m = 4 and n = 1. According to the 
framework of Section 3.2, the adjustment shares of W** in (23) are proportional to the 
vector of θ∆ , which are given by the estimates in each column depending on the omitted 
variable. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) tried to find the regression which would 
provide a plausible solution of differentials by selecting the variable to be omitted. 
[Insert Table 2] 
In order to evaluate the optimal adjustment share of Z**, we assume that the 
government wants to adjust the shares of component by 2% points as a total from the 
present level, that isξ = 0.02. Moreover, we assume the present level is equal to the 
sample means for each period. Table 3 shows ),,( **3**** θθτ ∆′−∆′∆=∆′ J , ω (present levels 
of the share), Z** (optimal adjustment vector), and **ω (adjusted vector of the shares) 
for each sample period. The entries of Z** in Panels (a) and (b) satisfy the restriction  
dθ h +dθ s+ dθ e +dθ r = 0 in (15), and are independent from the choice of omitted 
variables. For the first period (1981-1990), we obtain the largest increase (dF** = 
1.70% points) of the growth rate from the level at the sample means of ω if we choose 
the adjustment vector of =′ **Z  (-0.79, -0.69, 1.40, -0.87, 0.17) % points. The vector of 
Z** neither coincide with nor are proportional to the columns (1) through (4) on Panel 
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(a) in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks. 
 The previous researches proposed theoretical frameworks for analyzing the 
optimal share of fiscal spending and attempted to implement them into empirical studies 
by using the linear regressions, while they did not explicitly construct an empirical 
framework for finding the optimal share or the optimal adjustment starting from the 
given fixed share. They only argue that the present level of a particular category is 
below the optimal and the level of this category should be increased toward the optimal 
with the same amount of decrease in the omitted variable if the estimate of coefficient 
for the corresponding variable is positive. The result from this discussion crucially 
depends on what the omitted variable is. 
This paper proposes a tractable theoretical framework linking the share of fiscal 
expenditures to economic growth and an empirical framework adjusting the present 
shares of component of fiscal expenditures toward the optimal ones. We introduce a 
gradient method in order to determine the optimal adjustment of shares. The gradient 
method explicitly takes account for the cost of adjusting the share of component and 
incorporates the constraint that shares of components are summed up to one. The 
optimal adjustment shares are proportional to the deviations from the average over 
components of a gradient vector and independent from the choice of omitted variables 
from the regression equations. The discussion of previous researches is not necessarily 
conformable to our result. We can completely estimate the optimal adjustment share by 
using the linear regression with any choice of omitted variable if the adjustment cost of 
ξ is given. In this sense, our result does not suffer from a multicollinearity in the linear 
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regression but is considering all adjustment costs unlike most of the previous researches. 
An empirical example from the annual panel data for Japanese prefectures illustrates 
how the procedure proposed in this paper numerically works.  
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Appendix 1:  Direct methods to find the optimal solution of (14) 
We need all parameters in (14) to find the optimal solution. The first way to obtain them 
is to estimate the regression for (11) with a slight modification. After taking the 
logarithm of (11), we move the first term of the right hand side to the left and estimate 
the regression: 
( )
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δθα
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ατα
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τσσ
ρ
−−−+++++−=
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +≡
1lnlnlnlnln1ln1 
11lnln

        (A1) 
by using the data of resh θθθθ ,,, , τ , y and ρ, σ.  
 The second way is to estimate the following function:  
λδγβ )/()/()/()/(/ krkekskhAky = .                              ? (A2) 
where the first order homogeneous restriction α+β+ γ+ δ+ λ=1 is incorporated in the 
Cobb-Douglas production function (2).The second way needs the data of h, s, e, r, y and 
k. The main difference between the two formulations lies in the point whether we 
require the data of k in (A2) or (ρ, σ) in (A1). In general, the data of k is so much 
different in each prefecture, though the data of (ρ, σ) is not. The reliable data of k for 
each prefecture is necessary but not available for the most countries. The 
prefecture-basis capital stock k is not published in Japan. The second way may not be 
useful under this circumstance of data availability in Japan. 
 
Appendix 2 : Derivations of (16), (19), (23) 
Derivations of (16): We can solve the problem of (15) by using the Lagrange multiplier 
method: 
)),0()(
2
1
42
2
1 ZJZZZL ′−′−+Γ′= ϕξϕ ;                          
(i) 0),0( 421 =′′−−Γ=∂
∂ JZ
Z
L ϕϕ , (ii) ,02
1
=′−=∂
∂ ZZL ξϕ (iii) ,042 =
′=∂
∂
θϕ ZJ
L  (A3)               
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where ),( θτ Γ′Γ=Γ′  and ),( θτ ZZZ ′=′  are evaluated at the present level of 
),( θτ ωωω ′=′ . From (i), we have 
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Using (iii) and (A4), we obtain )(10 424
1
4 JJZJ ϕϕ θθ −Γ′=′= , and 
γγϕ θ ==Γ′′= ∑ =− 4 141442 41)( j jJJJ . (A5) 
Substituting 2ϕ  in (A.4) by γ , we have 
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1
4
1
1)(1 θθθ ϕγϕ Γ≡−Γ= JZ . (A6) 
Then, due to (A4) and (A6), we have 
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and 2/1**21 )(
1
θθτξϕ ΓΓ′+Γ= from (ii) and (A7). Finally, we obtain 
2/1**2 )(** θθτξ ΓΓ′+Γ=Γ′= ZdF . 
Derivations of (19): In a similar manner to (15), we solve the problem of (18): 
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where a relation 3331333 4
1)( JJIJJI ′−=′+ −  is used. 
Due to (ii) and (A9), we have ))((1 **333**202
1
2
θθϕξ ∆′+∆′+∆=′= JJIAWW  and 
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∆+∆∆+= θθθαξϕ                                    (A10) 
The solution in (19) follows from (A.9) and (A.10).The last element of Z** in (20) is 
obtained from 0**3
** =∆′+ θθ Jd r .  
The equivalence of *** θθ ∆=Γ  follows from the fact: for j = 1, 2, 3 
∑ =−=∆−−=∆ 4 14** , 4143)( i ijjj γγγγ θθ  and ∑∑ == −=∆−=∆ 4 143 1 ** ,** 4, 41 i ij j γγθθ . 
Derivations of (23): The problem of (22) can be understood as a special case of (18) in 
which the matrix A is replaced by a unit matrix: 
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1 WWWL ′−′+∆′= ξϕ ;                                      (A11)  
(i) 01 =−∆=∂
∂ W
W
L ϕ ,  (ii) 02
1
=′−′=∂
∂ WWL ξϕ .  
Then, in an analogous way to (18) we obtain the solution 
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Due to (ii) and (A12), we have ( ) 2/121 '1 θθτξϕ ∆∆+∆′= . The last element of Z*** in (23) 
is obtained from 03
*** =∆′+ θθ Jd r .  
 
Appendix 3 : Effects of omitted variables on the estimates  
This appendix examines the effect of omitted variables on the estimates in a 
regression with perfect collinearity, and shows that any additional use of regressions 
with different omitted variables can not extract further information from the given data 
set since the estimates of all other regressions can be computed from the estimates of 
the originally chosen regression equation. We use a model and notation of Kneller, 
Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) in this appendix, which are not necessarily conformable 
to the main body, for the purpose of clarifying their discussion. Let a linear regression 
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be  
NtIiuXYy it
m
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,,1 ,,...,1     ,
110
…==+++= ∑∑ == γββ            (A13) 
with a linear constraint among the variables: 0
1
=∑ =mj jitX , where jitY  are non-fiscal 
variables and jitX denote fiscal variables . If we omit the variable mitX from (A13), the 
equation is expressed as 
  ,
1
1 ,10 it
m
j jitmj
k
j jitjit
uXYy +++= ∑∑ −== γββ                           (A14) 
where 1,,1,, −=−= mjmjmj …γγγ . On the other hand, if we omit another 
variable itnX , , the equation has the form: 
  ,
)(1 ,10 it
m
njj jitnj
k
j jitjit
uXYy +++= ∑∑ ≠== γββ                        (A15) 
where )(,,1;, njmjnjnj ≠=−= …γγγ .T he following relation among the coefficients of 
(A14) and (A15) holds: 
     )(1,,1,,, njmjmnmjnj ≠−=−= …γγγ ; and mnnm ,, γγ −= .              (A16) 
We can utilize the OLS method to estimate the parameter of either (A14) or (A15), 
while it is not applicable for (A13). The next proposition indicates that the estimates of 
(A14) completely determine those of (A15). 
Proposition 1: Let the OLS estimates of (A14) and (A15) be mj ,γˆ and nj,~γ respectively. 
Then, the estimates nj,~γ are completely determined by the following equation: 
     mnmjnj ,,, ˆˆ~ γγγ −=  and mnnm ,, ˆ~ γγ −= .                              (A17) 
Proof: We can assume n = m-1 without loss of generality by arranging the order of 
variables. In matrix notations, equation (A14) and (A15) are respectively expressed as: 
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and similarly 
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We have the relation among the matrices of independent variables W and Z: 
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where the constraint 012 =++ −−∆ mmm XXJX  is used. From (A18), (A19) and (A20), 
we have uZQy += β , implying βδ Q= . Plugging ZQW =  in the normal equation 
yWWW ′=′ βˆ  for (A18), we have ( ) δβ ~ˆ 1 =′′= − yZZZQ . This proves Proposition 1. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel (a) (1981-1990)  
 
 
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
(prefecture/year) 
Maximum 
(prefecture/year) 
Growth rate of prefectural GDP  3.78 2.26 -8.97(Wakayama/1983) 9.92(Kagawa/1988) 
Share of health            θh 9.38 1.64 6.24(Niigata/1987) 15.29(Fukuoka/1984) 
Share of security           θs 5.63 2.05 1.53(Shimane/1984) 19.11(Tokyo/1986) 
Share of education         θe 27.21 4.52 15.08(Tokyo/1989) 40.43(Kanagawa/1984) 
Share of the remainder      θr 57.78 6.32 38.06(Kanagawa/1982) 72.92 (Shimane/1984) 
Tax rate                  τ 12.85 4.50 5.33(Osaka/1984) 26.23(Shimane/1984) 
Panel (b) (1991-2002)  
 
  
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
(prefecture/year) 
Maximum 
(prefecture/year) 
Growth rate of prefectural GDP  0.83 2.13 -6.31(Iwate/2001) 11.70(Shiga/1991) 
Share of health           θh 10.15 1.72 6.68(Nagano/1995) 18.18(Hyogo/1994) 
Share of security          θs 5.57 2.00 3.35(Shimane/1999) 13.75(Tokyo/2002) 
Share of education         θe 23.47 4.15 14.49(Tokyo/1992) 36.45(Kanagawa/2002) 
Share of the remainder     θr 60.81 6.12 38.54(Kanagawa/2002) 70.82(Shimane/2000) 
Tax rate                 τ 13.87 6.27 5.31(Kanagawa/1991) 38.75(Shimane/1999) 
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Table 2. Estimation results 
  
Panel (a)  (1981-1990)  (No. of observations=423) 
Omitted variables health (1) security (2) education (3) the remainder (4) 
Constant 
 
-12.616 
(17.367) 
77.979** 
(35.806) 
-20.735* 
(10.677) 
24.549*** 
(7.073) 
Share of health    θh ___ -0.906** 
(0.412) 
0.081 
(0.231) 
-0.372* 
(0.200) 
Share of security   θs 0.906** 
(0.412) 
___ 
 
0.987** 
(0.437) 
0.534 
(0.365) 
Share of education  θe -0.081 
(0.231) 
-0.987** 
(0.437) 
___ 
 
-0.453*** 
(0.129) 
Share of remainder  θr 0.372* 
(0.200) 
-0.534 
(0.365) 
0.453*** 
(0.129) 
___ 
 
Tax rate          τ -0.343 
(0.231) 
-0.343 
(0.232) 
-0.343 
(0.232) 
-0.343 
(0.231) 
Adjusted R-square 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 
Panel (b)  (1991-2002)  (No. of observations=564) 
Omitted variables health (1) security (2) education (3) the remainder (4) 
Constant 
 
-2.857 
(8.078) 
20.616 
(27.680) 
-4.102 
(7.212) 
0.586 
(2.314) 
Share of health     θh ___ 
 
-0.235 
(0.295) 
0.012 
(0.124) 
-0.034 
(0.089) 
Share of security    θs 0.235 
(0.295) 
___ 
 
0.247 
(0.331) 
0.200 
(0.278) 
Share of education  θe -0.012 
(0.124) 
-0.247 
(0.331) 
___ 
 
-0.047 
(0.085) 
Share of remainder  θr 0.034 
(0.089) 
-0.200 
(0.278) 
0.047 
(0.085) 
___ 
 
Tax rate           τ 0.015 
(0.017) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
Adjusted R-square 0.438 0.438 0.438 0.438 
 
Note: All regressions include prefecture-specific dummies and time-specific dummies  
(fixed effect) although not reported here. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks 
 indicate variables significant levels; 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). 
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Table 3. Optimal adjustment of **Z in (20) 
 
 Panel (a)(1981-1990)  (b)(1991-2002)  
 **∆  Z**(%) ω(%) ω**(%) **∆  Z**(%) ω(%) ω**(%)
Tax rate     -0.343 -0.79 12.85 12.06 0.015 0.15 13.87 14.02
Health    -0.299 -0.69 9.38 8.69 -0.064 -0.64 10.15 9.51 
Security   0.607 1.40 5.63 7.03 0.171 1.71 5.57 7.28 
Education  -0.380 -0.87 27.21 26.34 -0.076 -0.77 23.47 22.7 
Remainder  0.073 0.17 57.78 57.95 -0.030 0.30 60.81 61.11 
Growth rate dF** = 1.70% dF** = 0.40% 
 
Note: The government is assumed to adjust the shares by 2% points as a total  
(ξ = 0.02). ),,( **3**** θθτ ∆′−∆∆=∆ J , **** Z+= ωω .  
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Figure 1. Gradient Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: M: maximum point of )(ωη F= , P: present level of ω, 
q: tangent line to the contour of ηω =)(F  at the present level 
 of ω, which lies on the tangent surface of ZdF 'Γ≡ . The  
arrow starting from the point P stands for the optimal  
differential vector Z*. 
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Figure 2. Linear approximation of the optimal shares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *hθ : element of *ω at the maximum of ( )** ωη F= .  
1
hθ : present level, *1 hh θθ < . 
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